RECENT CASES
sent them, it might be argued that the presence of the stipulation in the Burke case
should have given the defendants in the Lee case ground for collateral attack. The defendants were unable, however, to convince the court that there had been actual fraud
or collusion; and mere consent8 on the part of the representative probably does not open
the door to collateral attack.2
But it is suggested that there is a third ground upon which the defendants in the
instant case may attack the prior decree collaterally; a ground independent of any
holding as to whether a restrictive covenant may be imposed in a representative proceeding, and independent of any effect to be given to consent, fraud, or collusion. It is
true that so far as parties before the court were concerned the court's determination
that there was an operative agreement of covenant was not a jurisdictional determination, for the determination was not necessary to give the court jurisdiction over either
the subject matter or the parties; the court consequently had power to render a decree
effective upon the parties before it. But as to parties by representation, the determination that a covenant existed was a jurisdictional one: the power of the court to bind
these persons by representation lies solely in the existence of an operative agreement
whose signers constitute a class. Without the operative agreement there is no class;
without the existence of a class the court's jurisdiction is limited to the parties before
it, and it has no jurisdiction over those "represented."29
Insofar, then, as the decision holds that the defendants are bound, simply because they
were represented in the Burke case, it would seem that the decision in the Lee case cannot be supported. It is suggested, however, that the same result, so far as the parties
before the court in the Lee case were concerned, could have been reached on a sounder
ground. The court found that the party who was the plaintiff in the Burke case was
the wife of one of the defendants in the Lee case; and that the other defendants in
the Lee case were in collusion with the Burkes.30 No use of a representative suit theory
would have been necessary to estop substantially the same party from denying in the
second suit what he had alleged in the first.

Torts-Liability of Charitable Institutions-Effect of Indemnity Insurance Policy[Colorado].-The plaintiff, a paying patient in a charitable hospital, sought to recover
damages for negligence in medical treatment. The defendant contended that, as a
charitable institution, it was not liable for negligence. The plaintiff replied that a
judgment against the defendant would in no way affect the charitable trust fund, for
sInthe main, consent operates only as evidence that the representative was not in any
event a proper one, and that he could not have bound the "class" even if he had not consented.
Union Bank of Richmond v. Com'rs of Town of Oxford, 1i9 N.C. 214, 25 S.E. 966 (i896);
Kelley v. Milan, 127 U.S. 139 (x888); People v. Chicago, B. & I. R. Co., 247 Ill. 340, 93 N.E.
422 (IgIo). But cf. Board of Supervisors of Simpson County v. Buckley, 85 Miss. 713, 38 So.
104 (I9o5), where the presence of consent operated to permit collateral attack in what would
apparently otherwise-have properly been a representative suit.
29 See McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 9o (i916); Casswell v. Casswell, 12o Il.
377, i N.E.
342 (1887).

30Lee v. Hansberry 372 Ill. 369, 371, 24 N.E. (2d) 37, 40 (1939): "The evidence fully

justifies the finding of the Chancellor that the charges of the complaint were established."
The charges of the complaint were (Abstract of Record 1i4): "All the foregoing acts by said
parties were a part and parcel of the fraudulent scheme and conspiracy inaugurated by James
Joseph Burke that said restricted area would no longer be free of negro inhabitants.!

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
the defendant was insured against liability for the torts of its agents in the conduct of
the hospital. The trial court dismissed the action. On appeal held, a charitable institution is liable for the tort of its agent and may be pursued to judgment, but the institution's trust property cannot be taken to satisfy such judgment. Where, however,
the institution has indemnity insurance, recovery may be had against it since this will
not divert the trust funds from their charitable purpose. Judgment reversed. O'Connor v. Boulder ColoradoSanitariumAss'n.'
Exemption of charitable institutions from tort liability is usually predicated on one
of the following theories: public policy demands that the trust fund be not diverted
to paying damages; the assets of the institution are impressed with a trust for charitable purposes and may not be diverted to another use; or, the doctrine of respondeat
superior is inapplicable to an institution not conducted for profit.2 Some courts narrow
the exemption, permitting recovery against a charitable institution by a person other
than a recipient of benefits;3 a beneficiary is precluded from recovering by the fiction
that he impliedly waived all claim for injuries and assumed the risk thereof.4 A few
courts deny the exemption entirely, applying to charitable institutions the ordinary
rules of tort liability.s
In those jurisdictions where charitable institutions have been exempted from tort
liability, courts have concluded that the mere procurement of insurance is irrelevant,6
because liability of the insured is a prerequisite to holding the insurer under a strict
liability insurance policy.7 Such a result would even more dearly follow where there
was an indemnity policy, under which the insured must not only be held liable but
must also have paid before the insurer is obligated. 8 Similarly, in the action of a minor
child against a parent for damages incurred as a result of the parent's negligence, it has
*96 P. (2d) 835 (Colo. 1939).
* 2 Bogert, Trusts § 401 (1935); 3 Scott, Trusts § 402 (1939); o Fletcher, Cyclopedia of
the Law of Private Corporations §§ 4921, 4927.8, 4930 (rev. ed. 1931); Feezer, The Tort Liability of Charities, 77 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 191 (1928); Zollman, The Damage Liability of Charitable Institutions, i9 Mich. L. Rev. 395 (1921).
3 Cohen v. Gen'l Hospital Society, 113 Conn. i88, 154 Atl. 435 (1931); Cowans v. North
Carolina Baptist Hospitals, 197 N.C. 41, 147 S.E. 672 (1929); Phoenix Assur. Co. v. Salvation
Army, 83 Cal. App. 455, 256 Pac. ixo6 (1927); Bruce v. Central Methodist Episcopal Church,
147 Mich. 230, 110 N.W. 951 (1907).
4 Powers v. Massachusetts Homeopathic Hospital, rog Fed. 294 (C.C.A. ist i9oi); Burdell v. St. Luke's Hospital, 37 Cal. App. 310, 173 Pac. ioo8 (i918); see Hospital of St. Vincent
v. Thompson, 1i6 Va. ioi, 81 S.E. 13 (1914). But there is authority permitting recovery even
by a beneficiary where the injuries resulted from the negligence of the trustees or managers in
selecting servants. 3 Scott, Trusts 2151 (i939); Rest., Trusts § 402 (N935).
5 Glavin v. Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R.I. 41T (1879); Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n,
191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 ('915); Geiger v. Simpson Methodist Episcopal Church, 174 Minn. 389,
219 N.W. 463 (1928). The Rhode Island case has been overruled by statute. R.I. Gen. Laws
(1938) c. 116, § 95.
6 Greatrix v. Evangelical Deaconess Hospital, 261 Mich. 327, 246 N.W. 137 (i933); Enan
v. Trustees of Boston University, 270 Mass. 299, 17o N.E. 43 (i93o); Mississippi Baptist
Hospital v. Moore, i56 Miss. 676, 126 So. 465 (1930); Williams, Adm'x v. Church Home for
Females, 223 Ky. 355, 3 S.W. (2d) 753 (1928); Levy v. Superior Court of California, 74 Cal.
App. 171, 239 Pac. 1ioo (1925).
Ibid.
7 Richards, Insurance § 503 (1932).
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generally been held that insurance does not create a right to sue where one otherwise
would not exist.9
Nevertheless, in view of the theory underlying the Colorado rule with respect to
charities, the decision in the principal case is tenable. Colorado and a minority of other
jurisdictions have adopted the theory that a charity is liable when its representatives
have committed a tort, but judgment will be entered against it only when it appears
that the judgment can be satisfied without depleting the trust funds1o As a matter of
technical reasoning, then, the holding in the instant case can be said to be strictly in
accord with the rationale of the rule of immunity since on the one hand, the charity
was liable, hence the prerequisite to liability by the insurer is fulfilled, and on the other
hand, payment by the insurer will prevent depletion of the fund. The insurer should
hardly be able to assert as a defense to liability of the insured that the latter has no
funds with which to pay the judgment. In answer it may be urged that in the absence
of assets not devoted to charitable purposes, there is no cause of action, under the
Colorado theory; hence, predicating liability on an insurance policy is unwarranted.
Irrespective of the validity of the technical justification of the decision, the result
reached appears desirable in view of the general disapproval of the rule of immunity.In any event, making an exception to the rule of immunity in cases where there is insurance preserves whatever policy the rule represents and accords justice to the injured
party. Furthermore, the insurance company should not be able to assert against the
insured or against third parties whom the insured may have desired to protect that
the premium was paid for a non-existent risk = Sanction for this view is found in two
recent Tennessee cases 3 and in cases allowing actions by minor children against parents, when the parent is covered by a liability insurance policy.X4

Workmen's Compensation-Subrogation of Insurer-Effect of Settlement by Third
Party with Injured Employee--[Georgia].--On April 13,1937, a motorcyclepoliceman
was injured by a manufacturer's payroll car, which he was escorting. On May 20,
9Lund v. Olson, z83 Minn. 515, 237 N.W. i88 (1931); Norfolk S. R. Co. v. Gretakis, z62
Va. 597, 174 S.E. 841 (i934); Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W. (2d) 468 (1938);
Owens v. Auto Mut. Indemnity Co., 235 Ala. 9, 177 So. 133 (1937). Contra: Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, i5o Ad. 905 (z93o); see Lusk v. Lusk, 1I3 W.Va. 17, i66 S.E. 538 (1932).
x° St. Mary's Academy v. Solomon, 77 Colo. 463, 238 Pac. 22 (1925); Brown v. St. Luke's
Hospital, 85 Colo. 167, 274 Pac. 740 (1929); Gamble v. Vanderbilt University, 138 Tenn. 6x6,
200 S.W. 5o (1918); Holder v. Massachusetts Horticultural Society, 21Z Mass. 370, 97 N.E.
630 (1912); McMillen v. Summenduivot Lodge, 143 Kan. 502, 54P. (2d) 985 (1936); Robertson
v. Executive Com'n of Baptist Convention, 55 Ga. App. 469, 19o S.E. 432 (1937).
" 2 Bogert, Trusts §4o (1935); Harper, Torts § 294 (934); Feezer, op. cit. supra note 2;
Taylor, Charities-Liability for Torts, 2 U. of Cin. L. Rev. 72 (1928). The numerous exceptions which the courts have grafted on the rule may indicate judicial disapproval also.
123 Scott, Trusts 2153 (1939). See Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Moore, 156 Miss. 676,
687-8, 126 So. 465, 468 (193o).
13McLeod v. St. Thomas Hospital, z7o Tenn. 431, 95 S.W. (2d) 917 (1936); Vanderbilt
University v. Henderson, 127 S.W. (2d) 284 (Tenn. 1938); cf. Rogers v. Butler, 17o Tenn. 125,
92 S.W. (2d) 414 (1936).
14Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, i5o AUt. 905 (I930); see Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W.Va. 17,
166 S.E. 538 (1932).

